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COMPARATIVE HEALTH AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF THE SPS AND
ALTERNATIVE ELECTRICAL GENERATION SYSTEMS
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2 2 (i9 G  g°nneNationalLaboratory- Argonne, Illinois 60439
A comparative analysis of health and safety risks is presented for the
satellite power system (SPS) and five alternative baseload electrical generation
systems: a low-Btu coal gasification system with an open-cycle gas turbine com-
bined with a steam topping cycle (CG/CC); a light water fission reactor system
without fuel reprocessing (LWR); a liquid metal fast breeder fission reactor
system (LMFBR); a central station terrestrial photovoltaic system (CTPV); and a
first generation fusion system with magnetic confinement. For comparison, risk
from a decentralized "roof-top" photovoltaic system with battery storage (DTPV)
is also evaluated. Quantified estimates of public and occupational risks within
ranges of uncertainty were developed for each phase of the energy system on the
basis of lO00 MWe average system output. A load factor of 70% was assumed for
each system except the CTPV and DTPV for which 25% and 12% load factors, respec-
tively, were used. Back-up energy systems were not included in the evaluation.
More detailed system descriptions are provided in a companion paper. I Com-
ponents of the analytical procedure are illustrated in Fig. I. Also discussed
in the paper is the potential significance of related major health and safety
issues that remain unquantified.
For a comparative assessment that includes the more capital-intensive ad-
vanced technologies it is essential that risks from on-site construction and
risks from both direct and indirect facility component production be evaluated.
The latter indirect component production requirements (e.g., copper mining to
produce electrical equipment) were obtained from 1972 input-output tables of
the U.S. economy. As illustrated in Fig. 2, these indirect production risks
comprise a significant fraction of the relatively large construction phase
impact of the solar technologies. Although not shown, similar relative tech-
nology differences are obtained for non-fatal person-days-lost from occupational
accident and disease.
The construction phase impacts, when averaged over an assumed 30-yr plant
lifetime, bring the solar technology life cycle impacts to within the range of
uncertainty of the quantified risks for the LWR, LMFBR, and fusion nuclear tech-
nologies (Fig. 3). T_e relatively large CG/CC risks per lO00 MWe-yr illustrated
in Fig. 3 result primarily from public exposure to long-range transport of air
pollutants (4-74 premature deaths; adapted from ref. 2), coal transport acci-
dents, and coal mine disease and accidents. The relatively high risks of the
DTPV system are related to the lower load factor and resultant higher material
requirements, production risks for the storage batteries, and greater construc-
tion and maintenance requirements for the small, dispersed units.
In general, the more defined technologies (e.g., CG/CC, LWR) have a greater
number of quantifiable risks and fewer unquantifiable risks. The oppo_te is
true for the less-defined technologies (e.g., fusion, SPS). In contrast to the
apparent public willingness to accept limited known risks of energy systems,
recent experience with light water fission systems indicates that perceived
major risks that are less quantifiable or predictable may restrict or completely
halt energy system deployment if adequate assurances of very low impact proba-
bility cannot be given. For this reason potentially major, but unquantified,
risks should be given prominence comparable to the quantified risks discussed
above. Table l is a listing of potentially major unquantified issues
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identified for the seven technologies considered. Catastrophic events (i.e.,
events of low occurrence probability, but high impact per event) are included
in the unquantified category because of the inherent difficulty in predicting
occurrence rate and impact level. Furthermore, averaging expected catastrophic
impacts over plant lifetime does not indicate the full significance of these
potential events. Table l does not attempt to rank the unquantified issues,
although, for example, potential radiation release from fission is expected to
be greater than that from fusion.
A further perspective on the significance of relative technology risks is
provided by Fig. 4, which indicates the range of annual occupational risks for
2000-2020 scenarios of energy production with and without the SPSsystem. A
nearly constant total electrical energy capacity is assumedin this period for
the scenarios (Table 2). Becauseof high construction and manufacture and low
operation and maintenance impacts, the SPSscenario has higher initial, but
lower final occupational health and safety risks, as comparedto the scenario
without SPS. The quantified public risks, in particular those from coal, would
favor the SPSscenario with reduced conventional generation. However, the un-
quantified risks to the public in Table l restrict the delineation of defini-
tive conclusions related to total scenario risks.
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Table 1. Potentially Major Unquantifled Issues Identified
Solar Technologies (CTPV_ DTPV_ SPS) .
1. Exposure to Cell Production Emissions
2. Hazardous Waste From Dtsposal or Recycle of
Cell Materials
3. Chronic Low-level Microwave Exposure to
Large Popolattons (SPS only)
4. Space Vehtcle Crash tnto Urban Area (SPS only)
5. Exposure to HLLV Emissions (SPS only)
Coal Technologies (CG/CC)
(None Identified)
Nuclear Technologies (LWR, LMFBRt Fusion)
1. System Failure wtth Major Public Radiation
Exposure
2. Fuel Cycle Occupational Exposure to Chemically
Toxic Materials
3. Diversion of Fuel or By-product for Mtlltary or
Subversive Uses (LWR, LMFBR only)
4. Liquid Matal Ftre (LMFBR, Fusion only)
Table 2. Energy Scenario Baseload Capacities (GWe)
Year LWR CG/CC LMFBR SPS Fusion Total
2000 263
2020 (SPS) 188
2020 (W/O SPS) 213
238 34 0 0 535
71 78 200 ll 549
159 140 0 37 549
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I. Components for Comprehensive Energy Technology Health
and Safety Risk Assessment.
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Fig. 3. Quantified Fatalities From Facility Manufacture, Construction,
and O&M per lO00 MWe-yr (Diagonal lines represent ranges of
estimates.)
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